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Why dо the pоlice need а seаrch wаrrant tо search blood but no search warrant to search breath? Your answer must be based upon the current interpretation by the US Supreme Court in Birchfield v. North Dakota. Explain the rationale behind the US Supreme Court decision. You can listen to Birchfield v. North Dakota here: Rationale = reasoning = the logical basis for the decision Birchfield v. North Dakota Opinion Announcement - June 23, 2016 John G. Roberts, Jr. And Justice Alito has the opinions of the court in case 14-1468, Birchfield versus North Dakota and the consolidated cases. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. These are three cases; Birchfield versus North Dakota, Bernard versus Minnesota and Beylund versus Levi. They concern a new strategy that several states have adopted to combat the problem of drunk driving. All states have long made it a crime to drive a car with a blood alcohol concentration or BAC that exceeds a certain percentage. And because states need to measure drivers’ BAC to enforce such laws, all states also have what are called implied consent laws, which require suspected drunk drivers to cooperate with BAC testing, usually through a Breathalyzer test or a blood draw. In the past the standard penalty for refusing such a test was revocation of a driver's license. The laws at issue in these cases, however, increase the penalty and make it a crime to refuse a BAC test. All three petitioners here were arrested for drunk driving and asked to take such a test. The first Danny Birchfield was asked to submit to a blood test, he refused. The second William Robert Bernard Jr. was asked to submit to a breath test, and he also refused. The third, Steve Michael Beylund was asked to submit to a blood test. Unlike the other petitioners he agreed to take the test after being told that refusal would be a crime. In none of the three cases did the police have a search warrant authorizing the test that they demanded. The first two petitioners Birchfield and Bernard were criminally prosecuted for refusing to take the test. The third Beylund was prosecuted because his blood test revealed a BAC far in excess of the legal limit. North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the convictions of Birchfield and Beylund and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld Bernard's conviction. We granted certiorari in all three cases. Success for each of the petitioners depends on the proposition that the criminal law ordinarily may not compel a motorist to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test unless the police first obtain a search warrant. In our decision today we agree with that proposition insofar as it relates to blood draws but not when it comes to breath tests. This Court's Fourth Amendment cases have held that warrantless searches are generally unconstitutional unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. In today's decision we focus on how one of these recognized exceptions, the exception for searches incident to law for arrest applies in drunk driving cases. Since the nation's founding, police have been permitted, without obtaining a warrant, to search a person who has been lawfully arrested. Among other things this kind of search allows police to collect evidence showing that the arrestee committed the crime for which he was arrested. Of course, the kind of search we deal with here, a test of the arrestee's breath or blood, was not known when the Fourth Amendment was ratified. We determine whether searches like this are permissible searches incident to an arrest by weighing the degree to which they intrude on the arrestee's privacy against the degree to which they promote legitimate governmental interests. Starting with the privacy side of the balance we conclude that breath tests constitute very little intrusion on privacy interests. They are not painful or inherently embarrassing and they collect a substance that the arrestee would otherwise give up through the normal process of breathing. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive. They require piercing the skin of the person arrested and they extract blood, a substance that the person would normally retain. On the other side of the balance, states have a compelling interest in fighting drunk driving which claims thousands of lives every year and injures countless more. BAC testing provides crucial evidence for determining whether a person arrested on suspicion of drunk driving is guilty of that crime, and so BAC tests fit within one of the classic justifications for warrantless searches incident to arrest. That is they preserve evidence that the arrestee is guilty of the crime for which he was arrested, evidence that would otherwise disappear with the passage of time as the alcohol in the arrestee's bloodstream naturally dissipates. Moreover because the more severe punishment that states now imposed, that some states now imposed on most dangerous drunk drivers, that is those with very high BAC levels and those who are recidivists, because this more severe punishment imposed for these serious offenders gives those drivers are strong incentive not to let their blood alcohol concentration be tested. States need effective tools to ensure drivers’ cooperation with blood alcohol concentration testing. Petitioners argue that states should nevertheless be obligated to obtain warrant whenever possible before insisting that drivers submit to BAC testing. But our cases make clear that the applicability of the search incident to arrest doctrine does not depend on the specifics of the particular case. Moreover, petitioners’ proposal would constitute a significant burden on courts and magistrates who would have to be available to issue search warrants 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, particularly in rural areas this burden might unduly impact the other important work of the courts. And for reasons explained in the opinion requiring a warrant in every drunk driving case would not provide any commensurate benefit. Still because the less intrusive breath test serves the state's interest in prosecuting drunk drivers just as well as the more intrusive blood test we hold that warrantless breath tests are permissible searches incident to arrest but blood tests are not. For these reasons and others set forth in our opinion we conclude that Birchfield may not be criminally convicted for refusing to submit to an unlawful warrantless blood draw. We reverse the North Dakota Supreme Court's judgment affirming his conviction. Bernard on the other hand was convicted for refusing a warrantless breath test which he had no Fourth Amendment right to refuse. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court affirming his conviction. Beylund agreed to take a blood test but only after the police advised him that the state could criminally prosecute him for test refusal. Because that advice was at least partially inaccurate given our holding today, we vacate the judgment affirming his conviction so that the North Dakota Supreme Court may reconsider on remand whether Beylund's consent was sufficiently voluntary to justify the warrantless blood test. Justice Sotomayor has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Justice Ginsburg joins. Justice Thomas has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and in part and dissenting in part.
In relаtiоn with Questiоn 21, list thоse cаses аbove that do NOT require a search warrant and explain why for each of the cases
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