Mandated reforms, approved by a federal judge, with a court-…
Questions
Mаndаted refоrms, аpprоved by a federal judge, with a cоurt-appointed monitor to oversee progress, are called ____________.
Which bоnes аre the cheek bоnes?
Excerpts frоm G.A. Cоhen *As аlwаys, these selectiоns аre heavily edited for content and clarity. [From Justice, Freedom and Market Transactions', in Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995),56–9.] The Right extols the freedom enjoyed by all in a liberal capitalist society. The Left complains that the freedom in question is meagre for poor people. The Right rejoins that the Left confuses freedom with resources. 'You are free to do what no one will interfere with your doing', says the Right. 'If you cannot afford to do it, that does not mean that someone will interfere with your doing it, but just that you lack the means or ability to do it. The problem the poor face is lack of ability, not lack of freedom'. The Left may then say that ability should count for as much as freedom does. The Right can then reply, to significant political effect: so you may think, but our priority is freedom. What the Right means by freedom is generally understood as the libertarian absence of interference: persons are considered free so long as there is no one or no thing preventing an action that person wishes to do. So, for example, one is free to walk down the street until there is a police barrier, and freedom ends at that point where the wall begins. In my view, this right-wing stance depends strongly on the role of money. Money is unlike intelligence or physical strength, poor endowments of which do not, indeed, prejudice freedom, where freedom is understood as absence of interference. The difference between money and those endowments implies, I shall argue, that lack of money is indeed a form of unfreedom, especially if we take the Rights preferred notion of freedom, freedom from interference. To see this, begin by imagining a society without money, in which courses of action available to people, courses they are free to follow without interference, are laid down by the law. The law says what each sort of person, or even each particular person, may and may not do without interference, and each person is issued with a set of tickets detailing what she is allowed to do. So I may have a ticket saying that I am free to plough this piece of land, another one saying that I am free to go to that opera, or to walk across that field, while you have different tickets, with different freedoms written on them. Imagine, now, that the structure of the options written on the tickets is more complex. Each ticket lays out various courses of action that I may perform. I may do A and B and C and D, or, I may do B and C and D and E, or, I may do E and F and G and A, and so on. If I try to do something not licensed by my tickets or ticket, armed force intervenes. Just as if you were at a carnival, these tickets say what my freedoms (and, consequently, my unfreedoms) are. My argument is that money acts just like tickets at a carnival: the sum of money is license to perform a set of actions—actions, like, for example, buying a plane ticket to visit your family, or purchasing clothes at the mall. A lack of money is a direct interference in your ability to do an action, much as if you were walking down the street freely, only to have your movement stopped by a policy barricade. You are free, up until the point that a barrier stops you, and for most of us, that barrier is money. Suppose that someone is too poor to buy a plane ticket to visit her family. Formally, by the legal structure of the state she is free because no law prevents her from boarding the plane. Yet, clearly she is unable to board the plane because money acts as a barrier—as a restriction on her freedom. As far as her freedom is concerned, this is equivalent to “buying a plane ticket to visit her family” not being written on someone's ticket at the carnival. The woman I have described has the capacity to visit her family, she can physically present herself at the airport. But a barrier will exist that prevents her from getting on the plane. The only way that she will not be prevented from getting and using such things is by offering money for them. To have money is to have freedom, and the assimilation of money to mental and bodily resources misrepresents the reality of the social role of money. Being born poor is not equivalent to being born without a leg, or with a learning disability. Money will easily compensate for those birth chances, but nothing but money can compensate for being born poor. Question: do you feel free when you do not have enough money to go to the movies, when you friends go, or when you can’t afford basic necessities? Question: reflect upon the libertarian reading from last week. Are there ways that Marx and the libertarians can be brought together? ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. [From 'Socialism and Equality of Opportunity', expanded version of 'Equality, Equality of Opportunity and the Labour Party', Red Pepper (Nov. 1997).] Equality of opportunity removes obstacles to opportunity from which some people suffer and others don't. We can distinguish three forms of equality of opportunity, corresponding to three obstacles to opportunity which the three forms remove. First, there is a strictly legal definition of equality of opportunity. According to this definition, equality of opportunity exists so long as there is no legal restriction to hiring, firing, and other aspects of individual freedom. This legal equality of opportunity removes status restrictions on life chances, such as those under which serfs labored in a feudal society, and those from which persons of color suffered under Jim Crowe laws in the United States or the “Sistema de Castas” in the Spanish colonies. It is not wrong to call this equality of opportunity, because in a real way it increases the opportunities for individuals by removing the arbitrary constraints of legalized status and birth hierarchies. Question: define Jim Crowe and the “Sistema de Castas”. You may google it if you like. Question: connect this passage to the passages above on the legal restrictions related to freedom as interference. Beyond just looking at legal barriers, however, it is important to have a notion of equality of opportunity which understands the constraining effects of social circumstances which are not captured by formal legal structures: for example, those circumstances of birth and upbringing that constrain not by assigning an inferior legal status, but by casting them by birth into poverty and other kinds of unchosen disadvantages. Policies that promote this second, more robust notion of equality of opportunity, include those kinds of social and educational programs that even out (without ever truly erasing) advantages of wealth and the “birth lottery”, including early childhood education, school meal programs, and other types of educational support that provide more than the bare minimum of legal equality of opportunity, but something like a minimum bundle of goods that John Rawls argues in favor of. When this more substantive equality of opportunity is fully achieved, people's fates are much more likely to be determined by their native talent and their choices rather than their social background. Substantive, as opposed to strictly legal, equality of opportunity corrects for social disadvantage, but not for native, or inborn, disadvantage. But truly socialist equality of opportunity (the third kind) treats the inequality induced by native differences as no less unjust than that imposed by unchosen social backgrounds. Socialist equality of opportunity seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune. The strongest notion of equality of opportunity is when differences of outcome reflect nothing but differences of taste and choice, not differences of birth and accident. Question: in the fun-time quiz what job did you decide to do, and how many hours would you have liked to work? For example, under socialist equality of opportunity income differences are acceptable when they reflect nothing but different preferences in how hard someone wants to work, versus how much free time they want. Because people differ in their preferences, not only in what they want to buy but also in how they want to spend their time: some people, for example, want to work only a few hours and live an inexpensive lifestyle, while others prefer to work long hours and purchase more expensive cars, clothes, etc. Preferences across income and leisure are not in principle different from preferences across apples and oranges, and there can be no objection to differences in people's benefits and burdens that reflect nothing but different preferences. Let me spell out the analogy at which I have just gestured. Imagine a table loaded with apples and oranges. Each of us is entitled to take six pieces of fruit, with apples and oranges appearing in any combination to make up that six. Suppose, now, I complain that Sheila has five apples whereas I have only three. Then you point out that Sheila has only one orange whereas I have three, and that I could have had a bundle just like Sheila's had I sacrificed a couple of oranges. So, similarly, under a system where each gets the same income per hour, but can choose how many hours she works, the income/leisure trade-off is relevantly like the apples/oranges trade-off: inequality of income no more represents inequality, as such, than having four apples rather than two represents inequality, as such. As Benjamin Franklin said, “Time is money”, but here we mean this in a literal sense! Notice, then, that socialist equality of opportunity does not amount to an exact equality of outcome, and yet no egalitarian could object to differences of outcome because these differences do not constitute inequalities in the starting points of life, but only inequalities based on individual choice and preferences. Question: connect this with the idea of the subjectivity of utility and the law of diminishing returns from last week. Let’s imagine another scenario, one which perhaps you are quite familiar with: you and I and a group of friends all go on a camping trip. Because we are friends, there is no hierarchy among us; our common aim is that each of us should have a good time, doing whatever he or she likes best. Somebody fishes, somebody else prepares the food, and another person cooks it. People who hate cooking may do all the washing up, and so on. There are plenty of differences, but no inequalities to which anyone can have a principled objection. On camping trips, and on certain small-scale projects of other kinds, we cooperate with a concern that everybody has the same opportunity to flourish, insofar as the activity in question permits: in these contexts most people, even most anti-egalitarians, accept, indeed, take for granted, a norm of equality. The socialist aspiration is to realize that sort of equality and community in society as a whole. Question: in the real world is there some choice about what job one does? How does that work? Are we that far from Cohen’s ideal? The effort to realize the socialist ideal runs up against entrenched power and individual selfishness. Politically serious people must take those obstacles seriously. But they are not reasons to disparage the ideal itself.