Consider the following argument: All empirical functionalist…

Cоnsider the fоllоwing аrgument: All empiricаl functionаlists agree that minds are like computers, operating on syntax rather than semantics. This idea suffers from two serious problems: Searle's Chinese Room Problem, and the Problem of Mental Causation. Evidently, the only way to avoid the first problem is to reject content-externalism. But, rejecting it makes the second problem even more serious: without content-externalism, we cannot utilize Block's causal drainage argument to respond to the Problem of Mental Causation, thereby leaving the functionalist with no way to avoid the Eleatic threat of eliminativism. Since empirical functionalism is incompatible with eliminativism, empirical functionalism must therefore be false: minds are not like computers. Essay Question: After explaining all of the course material that is relevant to the above argument, what are two reasons for thinking that the above argument is unsound? (Hint -- your answer should explain: Putnam vs. Fodor's accounts of functionalism; syntax vs. semantics; the Chinese Room objection (including the Turing Test); content-externalism; the specific Problem of Mental Causation that applies to machine-state functionalism (double  hint: it is not Kim's exclusion argument); Block's causal drainage argument; and you should explain how the Eleatic Principle (you should use definition #3) can be used to argue for eliminativism (be sure to define this term too). After you do that, you should be able to raise two objections to the argument. Be sure to phrase them clearly; I advise that you say, "The first reason to think that the above argument is unconvincing is that it assumes X, but X is false because..." where X is some claim made in the argument, a background assumption, or the assumption that the conclusion follows from the premises.)