Consider the following argument: Argument: “Since every phil…

Consider the following argument: Argument: “Since every philosopher of mind agrees that mentality is to be characterized in terms of phenomenal experience, any theory of mentality which can plausibly account for phenomenal experience is better than theories that cannot. Type-identity theory, for example, is capable of offering a physicalist account of phenomenal experience, as shown by J. C. C Smart’s response to the Different Properties Objection, whereas Davidson’s Token-identity theory is not capable of offering such an account. Since there is no reason to think that mentality should not be characterized in terms of phenomenal experience, and since Davidson gives us no reason to reject type-identity theory, we should conclude that that J.C.C Smart’s Type-identity theory of mentality is better than Davidson’s Token-identity theory.” Essay Question: After explaining all of the course material that is relevant to the above argument, what are two reasons for thinking that the above argument is unconvincing? (Hint: your answer should explain what phenomenal experience is (giving an example); explain Smart’s type-identity theory (including the different properties objection and his account of sensation); explain Davidson’s token-identity theory (including his “intentionality” characterization of mental events). It would also be a good idea to explain Davidson’s paradox and Place’s phenomenological fallacy. After you do that, you should be able to raise two objections to the argument that have clearly stated targets. To do that, I advise that your final two paragraphs begin as follows: “The first(/second) reason to think that the above argument is unconvincing is that it assumes X, but X is false because…” where X is some claim made in the argument that you intend to target, such as a background assumption, or the assumption that the conclusion follows from the premises). 

Consider the following argument: All empirical functionalist…

Consider the following argument: All empirical functionalists agree that minds are like computers, operating on syntax rather than semantics. This idea suffers from two serious problems: Searle’s Chinese Room Problem, and the Problem of Mental Causation. Evidently, the only way to avoid the first problem is to reject content-externalism. But, rejecting it makes the second problem even more serious: without content-externalism, we cannot utilize Block’s causal drainage argument to respond to the Problem of Mental Causation, thereby leaving the functionalist with no way to avoid the Eleatic threat of eliminativism. Since empirical functionalism is incompatible with eliminativism, empirical functionalism must therefore be false: minds are not like computers. Essay Question: After explaining all of the course material that is relevant to the above argument, what are two reasons for thinking that the above argument is unsound? (Hint — your answer should explain: Putnam vs. Fodor’s accounts of functionalism; syntax vs. semantics; the Chinese Room objection (including the Turing Test); content-externalism; the specific Problem of Mental Causation that applies to machine-state functionalism (double  hint: it is not Kim’s exclusion argument); Block’s causal drainage argument; and you should explain how the Eleatic Principle (you should use definition #3) can be used to argue for eliminativism (be sure to define this term too). After you do that, you should be able to raise two objections to the argument. Be sure to phrase them clearly; I advise that you say, “The first reason to think that the above argument is unconvincing is that it assumes X, but X is false because…” where X is some claim made in the argument, a background assumption, or the assumption that the conclusion follows from the premises.)