The exam is 120 minutes. You will have an additional 15 minu…

The exam is 120 minutes. You will have an additional 15 minutes to print (if available), scan, and upload. If you submit after the allotted time, your exam will be considered late and may incur a late penalty.  After you complete your exam, scan your solutions into one .pdf file. Please upload your completed exam file by clicking on the “Add File” button underneath Question 1’s blank answer field. Download Exam Here: Midterm Exam closed book  no internet access allowed 2 pages (8×11”, double sided) formula note sheets, sheets may only contain formula and notes NO example problems you MUST attach your formula sheet to your exam and turn in the sheets along with your exam and the question sheet  regular calculator is allowed you may not use any programing language for any calculation write down every solution step clearly (no credit for unclear writing) If your exam utilizes Gradescope’s Student App, Do NOT upload to Gradescope. You will only upload your scanned exam file to this D2L quiz.

For this question, please use dec_data_final.csv  and downlo…

For this question, please use dec_data_final.csv  and download it by right click and save as.    Please construct a training data set and a testing data set by using 80% and 20% of the master data, respectively. To ensure the replicability of the exercise, please set the random seed to 1.  What is the number of observations assigned to the training data?  

Two gas stations next to each other set prices simultaneousl…

Two gas stations next to each other set prices simultaneously. They both compete in price non-cooperatively (i.e., no tacit collusion). Both stations have a marginal cost of $2 per gallon of gas. The gasoline in this market is a homogeneous good. No travel costs exist for the consumers, so all consumers in the market will buy from whichever gas station sets the lowest price. If the gas stations set the same price, the gas stations divide the number of customers evenly among them. This game is played once and then the world ends. We denote the price of gasoline per gallon station A and B charges as p_A and p_B, respectively. The demand for retail gasoline is given by Q = 100 – P, where P is the lowest price among two stations (i.e., P = min(p_A, p_B)).  Given the product is homogeneous, what would be the Bertrand equilibrium price in this market?