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Here is Anselm’s Ontological Argument (with numbered passage…

Here is Anselm’s Ontological Argument (with numbered passages).  You will be answering two multiple-choice questions over this.   1. AND so, Lord, do you, who do give understanding to faith, give me, so far as you knowest it to be profitable, to understand that you are as we believe; and that you are that which we believe. And indeed, we believe that you are a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be conceived—understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.   2. For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but be does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, be both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.   3. Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.   4. Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality. . . .   5. God cannot be conceived not to exist. —God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. —That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.   6. AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist;. and this being you are, O Lord, our God.   7. So truly, therefore, do you exist, O Lord, my God, that you can not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could conceive of a being better than you, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except you alone, can be conceived not to exist. To you alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that you do exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool? . . .   In passages 3 and 4 Anselm is saying:  

The second question over Kant’s passages:   . . . . I would…

The second question over Kant’s passages:   . . . . I would have hoped to obliterate this deep-thinking nonsense in a direct manner, through a precise account of the concept of existence, if I hadn’t found that the illusion created by confusing a •logical predicate with a •real predicate (i.e. a predicate that characterizes a thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a characterizing predicate is one that is added to the concept of the subject and fills it out. So it mustn’t be already contained in that concept. Obviously, ‘being’ isn’t a real predicate; i.e. it’s not a concept of something that could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain state or property. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition ‘God is omnipotent’ contains two concepts, each with its object—God and omnipotence. The little word ‘is’ doesn’t add a new predicate but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If I now take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence among them), and say ‘God is’, or ‘There is a God’, I’m not attaching any new predicate to the concept of God, but only positing the subject with all its predicates, positing the object in relation to my concept. The content of both ·object and concept· must be exactly the same: the concept expresses a possibility, and when I have the thought that its object exists I don’t add anything to it; the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred •real dollars don’t contain a cent more than a hundred •possible dollars. If there were something in the real dollars that isn’t present in the possible ones, that would mean that the concept hundred dollars wasn’t adequate because it didn’t capture everything that is the case regarding the hundred dollars. A hundred real dollars have a different effect on my financial position from the effect of the mere concept of them (i.e. of their possibility). For the existing object isn’t analytically contained in my concept; it is added to my concept. . . .; and yet the conceived hundred dollars are not themselves increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept. When I think of a thing through some or all its predicates, I don’t make the slightest addition to the thing when I declare that this thing is, i.e. that it exists. If this were wrong— i.e. if saying that the thing exists were characterizing it more fully than my concept did—then what I was saying exists wouldn’t be exactly what in my concept I had been thinking of as possible. If I have the thought of something that has every reality except one, the missing reality isn’t added by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with something missing, just as I have thought of it as having something missing; otherwise the existing thing would be different from the one thought of through my concept.   Descartes says that God must necessarily exist because existence is grounded in God’s essence (just as being omnipotent is grounded in God’s essence).  In response to Descartes’ Ontological argument, Kant is saying:  

Answer the 3 following questions using this same description…

Answer the 3 following questions using this same description: Consider three yellow, round peas, labeled A, B and C. Each was grown into a plant and crossed with a plant grown from a green wrinkled pea. You obtain exactly 100 peas from each cross (Note: for this question, assume both genes assort independently). A. What is the genotype of plant A if the cross yielded all 100 yellow, round peas?

Answer the following questions based on this passage (which…

Answer the following questions based on this passage (which will be repeated in each question):   “Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images.   And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like… Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.   Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?”   Take this line and answer the following questions: “Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?”   5. By “Sphere of opinion” he means: