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How many equilibria are present in this game?   

Suppose 5 participants are asked to guess a discrete number from the interval 1 to 100 (inclusive). The winner is the person whose guess is closest to the mean of the choices of all players. The winner gets a fixed prize, and in case of a tie the prize is split amongst those who tie. How many dominated strategies are present in this game?

Consider the game matrix below. In his preferred equilibrium, Patton assigns probability=_____ to strategy Sea.  

For this semester quiz, the following information is provided, click directly on the linked text to Preview the document during the quiz: Conversions and Constants to Memorize Periodic Table Ions to Know Solubility Rules Please note: The above information is provided at the end/bottom of this semester quiz.   Formatting instructions for answers typed into quiz textboxes:  If subscripts or superscripts are needed, use the subscript, T2 or superscript, T2 buttons. If the wrong one is displayed in the menu bar, click the down arrow next to it to choose the other one. Click on the button to turn it on, then click on it again to turn it off. For numbers in scientific notation , you can use E or the superscript button, T2.  So, either 1.5E9 or 1.5×109. If you need to make a textbox larger , grab and drag the dotted triangle just outside the bottom right corner.

How many first-stage pure-strategy Nash equilibria are present in this game?   

This game is dominance-solvable.   

Consider the following game between two players, A and B. Player A is endowed with $10 and is asked to transfer an amount between $0-$10 to player B (call this x). Whatever is transferred to player B is tripled (3x) – then player B can return any amount back between $0-$3x to player A. According to the subgame perfect equilibrium, player A will send $_____ to Player B.

Suppose 5 participants are asked to guess a discrete number from the interval 1 to 100 (inclusive). The winner is the person whose guess is closest to 5/3 times the mean of the choices of all players. The winner gets a fixed prize, and in case of a tie the prize is split amongst those who tie. In equilibrium, all players guess the winning number to be _______.

Suppose 5 participants are asked to guess a discrete number from the interval 1 to 100 (inclusive). The winner is the person whose guess is closest to the mean of the choices of all players. The winner gets a fixed prize, and in case of a tie the prize is split amongst those who tie. How many pure-strategy equilibria are present in this game?

How many Nash equilibria are present in this game?