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Capitalism, Socialism, Nihilism   Irving Kristol, The Public Interest, 1972 *As always, heavily edited for content and clarity.   Wherever and whenever the defenders of “free enterprise,” “individual liberty,” and “a free society” assemble these days, one senses a peculiar kind of nostalgia in the air. It is a nostalgia for that time when they were busily engaged in confronting their old and familiar enemies, the avowed proponents of a full-blown “collectivist” economic and social order. In the debate with these traditional enemies, advocates of “a free society” have, indeed, done extraordinarily well. It is therefore a source of puzzlement to them why, though the other side seems to have lost the argument, their side seems somehow not to have won it…Friedrich Hayek is not Milton Friedman, nor vice versa, and there are interesting differences between them but their thinking has converged into a powerful attack on the traditional socialist notions of central economic planning and a centrally-administered economy. As a result of the efforts of Hayek, Friedman, and others, the idea of a centrally-planned and centrally-administered economy has been discredited. Even in the socialist nations, economists are more interested in reviving the market than in permanently burying it. The question then naturally arises: If the traditional economics of socialism has been discredited, why has not the traditional economics of capitalism been vindicated? I should say that the reasons behind this state of affairs are quite obvious and easily comprehensible, even if the economists cannot understand them.             Question: what is he arguing about the libertarian position here?     On “thinking economically”   The original appeal of the idea of central economic planning-like the traditional appeal of socialism itself was cast primarily in economic terms. It was felt that such planning was necessary to (a) overcome the recurrent crises-i.e., depressions-of a market economy and (b) provide for steady economic growth and greater material prosperity for all. This importance which the structural Marxism of the Old Left, as we would call it today rested on the view they had discovered the laws of economic development, indeed, through the theory of surplus value they believed to have discovered the contradiction in all of capitalist economics. But the socialist impulse always had other ideological strands in it, especially a yearning for “fraternity” and “community,” and a revulsion against the “alienation” of the individual in liberal bourgeois society. These ideological strands were prominent among the “utopian socialists,” as Engels was to label them, and in the early thought of Karl Marx himself, in which economics received much less attention than religion and political philosophy. Question: what does Kristol think of the “utopian socialists”, why does he think their message is stronger than the structural Marxists? These non-economic values are prominent again today, in the thinking of what is called the “New Left.” The Old Left has been intellectually defeated on its chosen battleground, i.e., economics. But the New Left is now launching an assault on liberal society from quite other directions. One of the most astonishing features of the New Left-astonishing, at least, to a middle-aged observer is how little interest it really has in economics. I would put it even more strongly: The identifying marks of the New Left are its refusal to think economically and its contempt for bourgeois society precisely because this is a society that does think economically.             Question: what does the New Left share with the utopian socialists? What do I mean by “thinking economically”? I have found that it is very hard to convey this meaning to economists, who take it for granted that this is the only possible way for a sensible man to think -that, indeed, thinking economically is the same thing as thinking rationally. Economics is the social science par excellence of modernity, and economists as a class find it close to impossible to detach themselves from the philosophical presuppositions of calculated and rational self-interest. One of the keystones of modern economic thought is that it is impossible to have knowledge of what constitutes happiness for other people; that such knowledge is incorporated in an individual’s “utility schedules”; and this knowledge, in turn, is revealed by the choices the individual makes in a free market. This is not merely the keystone of modern economic thought-it is also the keystone of modern, liberal, secular society itself. It is at the heart of libertarian and utilitarian philosophy as well. This belief is so deeply ingrained in us that we are inclined to explain any deviation from it as perverse and pathological. Yet it is a fact that for several millennia, until the advent of modernity, people did not believe any such thing-would, indeed, have found such a belief to be itself shockingly pathological and perverse. Question: list as many of the thinkers as possible from this course that Kristol is criticizing here. In other words, which thinkers are dominantly “thinking economically”? For all pre-modern thinkers, knowledge of what constituted other people’s happiness was not only possible, but it was also a fact. True, such knowledge was the property of a small elite-religious, philosophical, or political. But this was deemed to be altogether proper: Such uncommon knowledge could not be expected to be found among common men. Question: which thinkers from this course would agree with Kristol that a different type of happiness is possible? You did not need a free market or a free society to maximize individual happiness; on the contrary, a free market, not being guided by the wisdom of the elite, was bound to be ultimately frustrating, since the common people could not possibly know what they really wanted or what would really yield them “true” happiness. Now, we know from our experience of central economic planning that this pre-modern approach is fallacious-but if, and only if, you define “happiness” and “satisfaction” in terms of the material production and material consumption of commodities. But, if you do not define happiness as consumption that is, if you refuse to “think economically,” then the pre-modern view is more plausible than not. It is, after all, one thing to say that there is no authentically superior wisdom about people’s tastes and preferences in commodities; it is quite another thing to deny that there is a superior wisdom about the spiritual dimensions of a good life. Question: do you agree that market consumption misunderstands true happiness? Notice we are back to the ancient political theory question of virtue ethics! Even today, that last proposition does not sound entirely ridiculous to us. And if you believe that man’s spiritual life is infinitely more important than his trivial and transient adventures in the marketplace, then you may tolerate a free market for practical reasons, within narrow limits, but you certainly will have no compunctions about overriding it if you think the free market is interfering with more important things.   The rejection of “thinking economically”   Modern economists are for the most part unaware that their habit of “thinking economically” only makes sense within a certain kind of world, based on certain peculiarly modern presuppositions. Thus, one of our most distinguished economists, Ludwig Von Mises wrote: Economies is a theoretical science and as such abstains from any judgment of value. It is not its task to tell people what ends they should aim at. It is a science of the means to be applied for the attainment of ends chosen, not a science of the choosing of ends. That statement sounds terribly modest and uncontroversial and platitudinous. But is it? Is it really so easy to separate means from ends?             Question: what is Ludwig von Mises arguing here? What if we are members of a monastic community and our end is holy poverty–not just poverty but holy poverty, a poverty suffused with a spiritual intention? Can economies help us attain this end? Or, to take a somewhat less extreme instance: What if we are loyal members of the kind of Orthodox Jewish community that even today is to be found in sections of New York City? In such a community, where most people are engaged in business, there unquestionably is some role for an economist–but only within narrow limits. In the end, the superior purpose of such a community is obedience to sacred Law and meditation on the meaning of this Law. For the maximization of such an end, economics is of little use.             Question: what is your highest end? Reflect on your own life for a minute! Modern, liberal, secular society is based on the revolutionary premise that there is no superior, authoritative information available about the good life or the true nature of human happiness-that this information is implicit only in individual preferences, and that therefore the individual has to be free to develop and express these preferences. What we are witnessing in Western society today are the beginnings of a counterrevolution against this conception of man and society. It is not an extension of modern principles, as the advocates claim, but instead a complete rejection of modernity.      

A nurse is assessing a client’s eyes for the accommodation response in PERRLA. What would the nurse expect to see?

A nurse is preparing to do an otoscopic examination on a 2-year-old child. Which of the following reflects correct procedure?

What patient comes to the clinic with a severe headache. This patient has a long history of migraines. The client is also complaining of severe light sensitivity. Which medical term would the nurse chart in the electronic medical record to describe this sensitivity? 

A 69-year-old patient has been admitted to an adult psychiatric unit because his wife thinks he is getting more and more confused. He laughs when he is found to be forgetful, saying “I’m just getting old!” After the nurse completes a thorough neurologic assessment, which findings would be indicative of Alzheimer’s disease?  Select all that apply:

A 2-year-old is brought to the clinic for a well-child exam. What is the best way for the nurse to proceed?

A nurse is monitoring a 4-month-old infant fontanel upon admission. On palpation of the fontanels, the nurse notes that the anterior fontanel is soft and flat. Based on this finding, which nursing action is appropriate?

The nurse elicits a positive Romberg’s sign during a physical exam. The nurse makes this determination based upon inspection of?

A nurse is examining a 2-month-old baby for developmental dysplasia of the hip by flexing the baby’s knees holding thumbs on the inner mid-thighs, and fingers outside on the hips touching the greater trochanter, the nurse adducts the legs until her thumbs touch and abduct the legs until the knees touch the table. The nurse does not notice any “clunking” and so is confident in recording:

When assessing muscle strength, the nurse observes the patient has complete range of motion against gravity with full resistance. What grade of muscle strength should the nurse record in the electronic medical record using a 0-5 point scale?