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In an athletics setting, Protective equipment is designed to:

Respond to each of the following questions.  1/2 point each A.   This is achest image.   B.  This chest Xray is rotated enough to be repeated C.  Scapula are out of the lung field on this image D  All required anatomy is visible on this image E.  This image has a deep enough inspiration E.  This image should be  

My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. I only maintain that it has very seldom had place in any degree, and never in its full extent. Therefore some other legitimate foundation of government must be acknowledged. The necessity of authority, that some will rule with dominion and others will follow in subjection, is not present in the origins of the species but it must now be acknowledged as the greater part of what we understand to be political obligation. It is as much an idea born with and linked to civilization as that of weights and measures, or the legal codes that proliferate in lawbooks. Reason, history, and experience show that all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular, which is to say that of force, conquest, and intrigue. In a settled constitution, the wants of the people may be consulted without danger but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military force or political craft decides who rules. When a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The new prince is watchful and jealous, and only time, by degrees, removes all these difficulties and accustoms the nation to view him as their lawful and legitimate ruler. For the people to form this opinion, they do not consider ideas of voluntary consent or promise. The original establishment was formed by violence and submitted to from necessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They recognize that it is not their consent gives the new prince a title: but they willingly consent because they see that he has attained this title independent of their choice. Suppose, that an usurper, after having banished his lawful prince and royal family, should establish his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and should preserve so exact a discipline in his troops, and so regular a disposition in his garrisons, that no insurrection had ever been raised, or even murmur heard, against his administration: can it be asserted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treason, have tacitly consented to his authority, and promised him allegiance, merely because, from necessity, they live under his dominion? Suppose again their native prince restored, by means of an army, which he levies in foreign countries: they receive him with joy and exultation, and show plainly with what reluctance they had submitted to any other yoke. I may now ask, upon what foundation the prince’s title stands? Not on popular consent surely: for though the people willingly acquiesce in his authority, they never imagine, that their consent made him sovereign. They consent; because they apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful sovereign. And as to that tacit consent, which may now be inferred from their living under his dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and usurper. Human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations must necessarily have place in every human institution; and it is happy where the enlightened genius of the age give these a direction to the side of reason, liberty, and justice: but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make: they are even dangerous to be attempted by the legislature: more ill than good is ever to be expected from them because they will be the source of many disorders, and still more dangers; in the end total anarchy and disintegration will rule. But would we have a more regular, at least a more philosophical, refutation of this principle of an original contract, or popular consent; perhaps the following observations may suffice. All moral duties may be divided into two kinds. First, there are those moral duties which men are impelled by a natural instinct and which operates on them, independent of all rational reflection, even to view of public or private utility. Duties of this kind are love of children, gratitude to benefactors, and pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage which results to society from such humane instincts, we pay them the just tribute of moral approbation and esteem: but the person, actuated by them, feels their power and influence, prior to reflection. Question: can you think of an example from your own life where you have acted on this first kind of natural law? Second, there are moral duties that are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected. It is thus justice, or a regard to the property of others, fidelity, or the observance of promises, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as it is evident that every man loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in this propensity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that license and the total dissolution of society which must ensue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation. The case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of allegiance, as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our primary instincts lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited freedom, or to seek dominion over others: and it is reflection only which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and public order. The observation of these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance and of that moral obligation which we attribute to it. Question: can you think of an example of when this second kind of natural law has happened to you? Question: how is Hume’s distinction a criticism of Locke’s notion of natural law? New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If scarce any man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on compact, it is certain, that it cannot in general, have any such foundation.  

You are given the following data for a population of rabbits over several years. Analyze the population size over time and determine whether this population exhibits exponential or logistic growth:   Year Population Size 1 10 2 50 3 150 4 300 5 450 6 500 7 510 8 515

In a mark-recapture study, 100 fish are captured, marked, and released into a lake. A week later, 200 fish are captured, and 20 of them are marked. What is the estimated total population size of fish in the lake?    

Henry Knox

The American Revolution is like a mighty river that grows as the stream heads towards its terminus. Write an essay that covers both the coming of the revolution and the successful victory of the colonies over the powerful British Empire. Prior to the revolution, how do the colonies go from outcasts, to flourishing and contented, to rebellious? Use the following prompts with generous explanation and specificity to answer this part of the essay: Salutary Neglect and habits of self-governance in each colony. (Give multiple examples.) John Locke, Whiggery, and the theory of a state of nature and the right to rebellion. The history of the following: the Borderlanders, Massachusetts, and Virginia. Signposts on the road to Revolution. During the revolution, there were many important individuals, but none more so than George Washington. Write this part of the essay that places Washington in his proper place as General in Chief of the Continental Army while explaining the predicaments he faced. What advantages did the colonies enjoy at the outset of the conflict? What about the British? What did the average American citizen think about this war in the beginning? With an eye towards Washington’s military record, explain his conduct and his army’s ability to fight at the following places: Long Island, Trenton and Princeton, Brandywine, the winter at Valley Forge, the siege of Yorktown. While writing this, explain his and his subordinate officers’ experience and who makes up the common foot soldier in the army? What was life like in the continental army for the average soldier? Explain the significance of Washington’s actions as a supreme commander in the following areas: relations with Congress, his personal valor, money and compensation for him and his soldiers, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the resignation of his commission in 1783 at the end of the war.  

Excerpts from G.A. Cohen   *As always, these selections are heavily edited for content and clarity.   [From Justice, Freedom and Market Transactions’, in Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995),56–9.]   The Right extols the freedom enjoyed by all in a liberal capitalist society. The Left complains that the freedom in question is meagre for poor people. The Right rejoins that the Left confuses freedom with resources. ‘You are free to do what no one will interfere with your doing’, says the Right. ‘If you cannot afford to do it, that does not mean that someone will interfere with your doing it, but just that you lack the means or ability to do it. The problem the poor face is lack of ability, not lack of freedom’. The Left may then say that ability should count for as much as freedom does. The Right can then reply, to significant political effect: so you may think, but our priority is freedom. What the Right means by freedom is generally understood as the libertarian absence of interference: persons are considered free so long as there is no one or no thing preventing an action that person wishes to do. So, for example, one is free to walk down the street until there is a police barrier, and freedom ends at that point where the wall begins. In my view, this right-wing stance depends strongly on the role of money. Money is unlike intelligence or physical strength, poor endowments of which do not, indeed, prejudice freedom, where freedom is understood as absence of interference. The difference between money and those endowments implies, I shall argue, that lack of money is indeed a form of unfreedom, especially if we take the Rights preferred notion of freedom, freedom from interference. To see this, begin by imagining a society without money, in which courses of action available to people, courses they are free to follow without interference, are laid down by the law. The law says what each sort of person, or even each particular person, may and may not do without interference, and each person is issued with a set of tickets detailing what she is allowed to do. So I may have a ticket saying that I am free to plough this piece of land, another one saying that I am free to go to that opera, or to walk across that field, while you have different tickets, with different freedoms written on them. Imagine, now, that the structure of the options written on the tickets is more complex. Each ticket lays out various courses of action that I may perform. I may do A and B and C and D, or, I may do B and C and D and E, or, I may do E and F and G and A, and so on. If I try to do something not licensed by my tickets or ticket, armed force intervenes. Just as if you were at a carnival, these tickets say what my freedoms (and, consequently, my unfreedoms) are. My argument is that money acts just like tickets at a carnival: the sum of money is license to perform a set of actions—actions, like, for example, buying a plane ticket to visit your family, or purchasing clothes at the mall. A lack of money is a direct interference in your ability to do an action, much as if you were walking down the street freely, only to have your movement stopped by a policy barricade. You are free, up until the point that a barrier stops you, and for most of us, that barrier is money. Suppose that someone is too poor to buy a plane ticket to visit her family. Formally, by the legal structure of the state she is free because no law prevents her from boarding the plane. Yet, clearly she is unable to board the plane because money acts as a barrier—as a restriction on her freedom. As far as her freedom is concerned, this is equivalent to “buying a plane ticket to visit her family” not being written on someone’s ticket at the carnival. The woman I have described has the capacity to visit her family, she can physically present herself at the airport. But a barrier will exist that prevents her from getting on the plane. The only way that she will not be prevented from getting and using such things is by offering money for them. To have money is to have freedom, and the assimilation of money to mental and bodily resources misrepresents the reality of the social role of money. Being born poor is not equivalent to being born without a leg, or with a learning disability. Money will easily compensate for those birth chances, but nothing but money can compensate for being born poor.   Question: do you feel free when you do not have enough money to go to the movies, when you friends go, or when you can’t afford basic necessities?   Question: reflect upon the libertarian reading from last week. Are there ways that Marx and the libertarians can be brought together?   …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..   [From ‘Socialism and Equality of Opportunity’, expanded version of ‘Equality, Equality of Opportunity and the Labour Party’, Red Pepper (Nov. 1997).]   Equality of opportunity removes obstacles to opportunity from which some people suffer and others don’t. We can distinguish three forms of equality of opportunity, corresponding to three obstacles to opportunity which the three forms remove. First, there is a strictly legal definition of equality of opportunity. According to this definition, equality of opportunity exists so long as there is no legal restriction to hiring, firing, and other aspects of individual freedom. This legal equality of opportunity removes status restrictions on life chances, such as those under which serfs labored in a feudal society, and those from which persons of color suffered under Jim Crowe laws in the United States or the “Sistema de Castas” in the Spanish colonies. It is not wrong to call this equality of opportunity, because in a real way it increases the opportunities for individuals by removing the arbitrary constraints of legalized status and birth hierarchies.                Question: define Jim Crowe and the “Sistema de Castas”. You may google it if you like.                Question: connect this passage to the passages above on the legal restrictions related to freedom as interference. Beyond just looking at legal barriers, however, it is important to have a notion of equality of opportunity which understands the constraining effects of social circumstances which are not captured by formal legal structures: for example, those circumstances of birth and upbringing that constrain not by assigning an inferior legal status, but by casting them by birth into poverty and other kinds of unchosen disadvantages. Policies that promote this second, more robust notion of equality of opportunity, include those kinds of social and educational programs that even out (without ever truly erasing) advantages of wealth and the “birth lottery”, including early childhood education, school meal programs, and other types of educational support that provide more than the bare minimum of legal equality of opportunity, but something like a minimum bundle of goods that John Rawls argues in favor of. When this more substantive equality of opportunity is fully achieved, people’s fates are much more likely to be determined by their native talent and their choices rather than their social background. Substantive, as opposed to strictly legal, equality of opportunity corrects for social disadvantage, but not for native, or inborn, disadvantage. But truly socialist equality of opportunity (the third kind) treats the inequality induced by native differences as no less unjust than that imposed by unchosen social backgrounds. Socialist equality of opportunity seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune. The strongest notion of equality of opportunity is when differences of outcome reflect nothing but differences of taste and choice, not differences of birth and accident. Question: in the fun-time quiz what job did you decide to do, and how many hours would you have liked to work?       For example, under socialist equality of opportunity income differences are acceptable when they reflect nothing but different preferences in how hard someone wants to work, versus how much free time they want. Because people differ in their preferences, not only in what they want to buy but also in how they want to spend their time: some people, for example, want to work only a few hours and live an inexpensive lifestyle, while others prefer to work long hours and purchase more expensive cars, clothes, etc. Preferences across income and leisure are not in principle different from preferences across apples and oranges, and there can be no objection to differences in people’s benefits and burdens that reflect nothing but different preferences. Let me spell out the analogy at which I have just gestured. Imagine a table loaded with apples and oranges. Each of us is entitled to take six pieces of fruit, with apples and oranges appearing in any combination to make up that six. Suppose, now, I complain that Sheila has five apples whereas I have only three. Then you point out that Sheila has only one orange whereas I have three, and that I could have had a bundle just like Sheila’s had I sacrificed a couple of oranges. So, similarly, under a system where each gets the same income per hour, but can choose how many hours she works, the income/leisure trade-off is relevantly like the apples/oranges trade-off: inequality of income no more represents inequality, as such, than having four apples rather than two represents inequality, as such. As Benjamin Franklin said, “Time is money”, but here we mean this in a literal sense! Notice, then, that socialist equality of opportunity does not amount to an exact equality of outcome, and yet no egalitarian could object to differences of outcome because these differences do not constitute inequalities in the starting points of life, but only inequalities based on individual choice and preferences. Question: connect this with the idea of the subjectivity of utility and the law of diminishing returns from last week.       Let’s imagine another scenario, one which perhaps you are quite familiar with: you and I and a group of friends all go on a camping trip. Because we are friends, there is no hierarchy among us; our common aim is that each of us should have a good time, doing whatever he or she likes best. Somebody fishes, somebody else prepares the food, and another person cooks it. People who hate cooking may do all the washing up, and so on. There are plenty of differences, but no inequalities to which anyone can have a principled objection. On camping trips, and on certain small-scale projects of other kinds, we cooperate with a concern that everybody has the same opportunity to flourish, insofar as the activity in question permits: in these contexts most people, even most anti-egalitarians, accept, indeed, take for granted, a norm of equality. The socialist aspiration is to realize that sort of equality and community in society as a whole. Question: in the real world is there some choice about what job one does? How does that work? Are we that far from Cohen’s ideal?       The effort to realize the socialist ideal runs up against entrenched power and individual selfishness. Politically serious people must take those obstacles seriously. But they are not reasons to disparage the ideal itself.                 

Capitalism, Socialism, Nihilism   Irving Kristol, The Public Interest, 1972 *As always, heavily edited for content and clarity.   Wherever and whenever the defenders of “free enterprise,” “individual liberty,” and “a free society” assemble these days, one senses a peculiar kind of nostalgia in the air. It is a nostalgia for that time when they were busily engaged in confronting their old and familiar enemies, the avowed proponents of a full-blown “collectivist” economic and social order. In the debate with these traditional enemies, advocates of “a free society” have, indeed, done extraordinarily well. It is therefore a source of puzzlement to them why, though the other side seems to have lost the argument, their side seems somehow not to have won it…Friedrich Hayek is not Milton Friedman, nor vice versa, and there are interesting differences between them but their thinking has converged into a powerful attack on the traditional socialist notions of central economic planning and a centrally-administered economy. As a result of the efforts of Hayek, Friedman, and others, the idea of a centrally-planned and centrally-administered economy has been discredited. Even in the socialist nations, economists are more interested in reviving the market than in permanently burying it. The question then naturally arises: If the traditional economics of socialism has been discredited, why has not the traditional economics of capitalism been vindicated? I should say that the reasons behind this state of affairs are quite obvious and easily comprehensible, even if the economists cannot understand them.             Question: what is he arguing about the libertarian position here?     On “thinking economically”   The original appeal of the idea of central economic planning-like the traditional appeal of socialism itself was cast primarily in economic terms. It was felt that such planning was necessary to (a) overcome the recurrent crises-i.e., depressions-of a market economy and (b) provide for steady economic growth and greater material prosperity for all. This importance which the structural Marxism of the Old Left, as we would call it today rested on the view they had discovered the laws of economic development, indeed, through the theory of surplus value they believed to have discovered the contradiction in all of capitalist economics. But the socialist impulse always had other ideological strands in it, especially a yearning for “fraternity” and “community,” and a revulsion against the “alienation” of the individual in liberal bourgeois society. These ideological strands were prominent among the “utopian socialists,” as Engels was to label them, and in the early thought of Karl Marx himself, in which economics received much less attention than religion and political philosophy. Question: what does Kristol think of the “utopian socialists”, why does he think their message is stronger than the structural Marxists? These non-economic values are prominent again today, in the thinking of what is called the “New Left.” The Old Left has been intellectually defeated on its chosen battleground, i.e., economics. But the New Left is now launching an assault on liberal society from quite other directions. One of the most astonishing features of the New Left-astonishing, at least, to a middle-aged observer is how little interest it really has in economics. I would put it even more strongly: The identifying marks of the New Left are its refusal to think economically and its contempt for bourgeois society precisely because this is a society that does think economically.             Question: what does the New Left share with the utopian socialists? What do I mean by “thinking economically”? I have found that it is very hard to convey this meaning to economists, who take it for granted that this is the only possible way for a sensible man to think -that, indeed, thinking economically is the same thing as thinking rationally. Economics is the social science par excellence of modernity, and economists as a class find it close to impossible to detach themselves from the philosophical presuppositions of calculated and rational self-interest. One of the keystones of modern economic thought is that it is impossible to have knowledge of what constitutes happiness for other people; that such knowledge is incorporated in an individual’s “utility schedules”; and this knowledge, in turn, is revealed by the choices the individual makes in a free market. This is not merely the keystone of modern economic thought-it is also the keystone of modern, liberal, secular society itself. It is at the heart of libertarian and utilitarian philosophy as well. This belief is so deeply ingrained in us that we are inclined to explain any deviation from it as perverse and pathological. Yet it is a fact that for several millennia, until the advent of modernity, people did not believe any such thing-would, indeed, have found such a belief to be itself shockingly pathological and perverse. Question: list as many of the thinkers as possible from this course that Kristol is criticizing here. In other words, which thinkers are dominantly “thinking economically”? For all pre-modern thinkers, knowledge of what constituted other people’s happiness was not only possible, but it was also a fact. True, such knowledge was the property of a small elite-religious, philosophical, or political. But this was deemed to be altogether proper: Such uncommon knowledge could not be expected to be found among common men. Question: which thinkers from this course would agree with Kristol that a different type of happiness is possible? You did not need a free market or a free society to maximize individual happiness; on the contrary, a free market, not being guided by the wisdom of the elite, was bound to be ultimately frustrating, since the common people could not possibly know what they really wanted or what would really yield them “true” happiness. Now, we know from our experience of central economic planning that this pre-modern approach is fallacious-but if, and only if, you define “happiness” and “satisfaction” in terms of the material production and material consumption of commodities. But, if you do not define happiness as consumption that is, if you refuse to “think economically,” then the pre-modern view is more plausible than not. It is, after all, one thing to say that there is no authentically superior wisdom about people’s tastes and preferences in commodities; it is quite another thing to deny that there is a superior wisdom about the spiritual dimensions of a good life. Question: do you agree that market consumption misunderstands true happiness? Notice we are back to the ancient political theory question of virtue ethics! Even today, that last proposition does not sound entirely ridiculous to us. And if you believe that man’s spiritual life is infinitely more important than his trivial and transient adventures in the marketplace, then you may tolerate a free market for practical reasons, within narrow limits, but you certainly will have no compunctions about overriding it if you think the free market is interfering with more important things.   The rejection of “thinking economically”   Modern economists are for the most part unaware that their habit of “thinking economically” only makes sense within a certain kind of world, based on certain peculiarly modern presuppositions. Thus, one of our most distinguished economists, Ludwig Von Mises wrote: Economies is a theoretical science and as such abstains from any judgment of value. It is not its task to tell people what ends they should aim at. It is a science of the means to be applied for the attainment of ends chosen, not a science of the choosing of ends. That statement sounds terribly modest and uncontroversial and platitudinous. But is it? Is it really so easy to separate means from ends?             Question: what is Ludwig von Mises arguing here? What if we are members of a monastic community and our end is holy poverty–not just poverty but holy poverty, a poverty suffused with a spiritual intention? Can economies help us attain this end? Or, to take a somewhat less extreme instance: What if we are loyal members of the kind of Orthodox Jewish community that even today is to be found in sections of New York City? In such a community, where most people are engaged in business, there unquestionably is some role for an economist–but only within narrow limits. In the end, the superior purpose of such a community is obedience to sacred Law and meditation on the meaning of this Law. For the maximization of such an end, economics is of little use.             Question: what is your highest end? Reflect on your own life for a minute! Modern, liberal, secular society is based on the revolutionary premise that there is no superior, authoritative information available about the good life or the true nature of human happiness-that this information is implicit only in individual preferences, and that therefore the individual has to be free to develop and express these preferences. What we are witnessing in Western society today are the beginnings of a counterrevolution against this conception of man and society. It is not an extension of modern principles, as the advocates claim, but instead a complete rejection of modernity.      

A nurse is assessing a client’s eyes for the accommodation response in PERRLA. What would the nurse expect to see?