Dаvid Hume, "Of the Originаl Cоntrаct" (1748) *As always, highly edited fоr clarity and cоntent! When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we must necessarily allow, that nothing but their own consent could, at first, associate them together, and subject them to any authority. The people, if we trace government to its first origin in the woods and deserts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to submit, were either expressed, or were so clear and obvious, that it might well be esteemed superfluous to express them. Question: why might “cultivation by education” matter here? Question: what does Hume mean by “either expressed, or were so clear and obvious, that is might well be esteemed superfluous to express them”. If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain, are we asked in what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality, or something approaching equality, which we find in all the individuals of that species. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of established government. A man’s natural force consists only in the vigor of his courage; which could never subject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the advantages resulting from peace and order, could have had that influence. Question: why do you think Hume is making a distinction between the natural consent of early human societies, and that “force…which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political”? Yet even this consent was long very imperfect, and could not be the basis of a regular administration. The chieftain, who had probably acquired his influence during the continuance of war, ruled more by persuasion than command; and till he could employ force to reduce the refractory and disobedient, the society could scarcely be said to have attained a state of civil government. No compact or agreement, it is evident, was expressly formed for general submission; an idea far beyond the comprehension of savages: each exertion of authority in the chieftain must have been particular, and called forth by the present exigencies of the case: the sensible utility, resulting from his interposition, made these exertions become daily more frequent; and their frequency gradually produced a habitual acquiescence in the people. Question: what is Hume point about habituation here? Moreover, with the invention of writing, the arts, law, mathematics, engineering and luxury, in short, with the invention of all of the makings of civilization, the ideas of government have changed as well. The distance from these early humans to our own time is too great to assume that the remedies appropriate in such an earlier time are appropriate to our own. Would we suggest that we return to the barter economy of long ago, when today we have paper currency, standardized weights and measures, and thousands of years of toolmaking so that we can make fine clothes, watches, and furniture, as well as the canons and muskets that modern governments use to make war on one another? Such a suggestion is surely nothing but folly, and the reasoner cannot be thinking clearly. But the social contract philosophers do not address these considerations. They assert, not only that first governments arose from this kind of acquiescence, but that also, that, even at present, when it has attained its full maturity, it rests on no other foundation than their positive consent. They affirm, that all men are still born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unless bound by the obligation and sanction of a promise. Further, they argue that if any government has broken the articles of engagement, then subjects are thereby freed from their subjection and from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to these philosophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and such is the right of resistance, possessed by every subject. Note: Hume thinks all of this is bunk. This is his description of the failure of social contract theory. But these social contract theorists should look at the world as it is, and if consulting the historical record, they will find little that fits such an exalted and philosophical system. To the contrary, they will find for the most part that princes claim their subjects as their property, and assert their independent right of sovereignty, not that of consenting individuals and the social contract. They will also find subjects who acknowledge this right in their prince, and suppose themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to their parents. The bonds of political obedience have always been viewed as independent of our consent, as much in Persia and China as in France, Spain and England. Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that most men never make any inquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the principle of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of nature. Those men who, moved by historical curiosity, do investigate the origins of their government quickly discover, that they and their ancestors have for several ages, or from time immemorial, been subject to a particular government so that they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that political connections are founded altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you for treason and for loosening the ties of obedience—that is, if your friends has not yet committed you to an asylum for advancing such absurdities and delusions. But the social contract theorists argue that this contract is said to be the original contract and argue that although it may have been forgotten, it nonetheless remains operative. To which I respond that the agreement by which savage men first associated and conjoined their force, is far too ancient to now have any continuing authority, having been obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes. For the original contract to still be operative, we would have to show that every lawful government was at first founded on consent and a voluntary compact. Not only that, but we would have to show how the sons and daughters of the original covenanters were able to declare their assent as well, or else we would supposes the consent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the most remote generations, which these social contract theorists will never allow. Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretense of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people. When an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for him, by employing, sometimes violence, sometimes false pretenses, to establish his dominion over a people. Question: What is Hume’s argument here? Even the smoothest way, by which a nation may receive a foreign master, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honorable for the people; but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or legacy, according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers. But where no force interposes, and election takes place; what is this election so highly vaunted? It is either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no opposition: or it is the fury of a multitude, that follow a seditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows. Question: what is Hume’s opinion of elections? In reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total dissolution of government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of a new establishment depend upon a number, which nearly approaches to that of the body of the people: for it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wise man, then, wishes to see, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may speedily seize the prize, and give to the people a master, which they are so unfit to choose for themselves. So little correspondent is fact and reality to those philosophical notions. Question: what does Hume think of revolutions?
а 4kg оbject mоving аt 2m/s cоmes to а stop. what is the magnitude of the change in momentum??