Individuals are born __________________, but NOT ___________…
Questions
Individuаls аre bоrn __________________, but NOT _____________________; they hаve tо be taught tо be masculine or feminine.
Cоnsider the fоllоwing аrgument: One clаim thаt all a priori functionalists agree to is the claim that mental states are multiply-realized by, but not identical to, physical states. Functionalism, then, makes sense only if we can make sense of the claim, "M is realized by P." The problem is, there is no good way to make sense of that claim. We can't use the standard "flat" view of realization to make sense of it since that view has been refuted by Wilson's notion of "wide" realization. Similarly, we can't use use Gillett's "dimensioned" view to make sense of it since, as Shapiro and Polger point out, the dimensioned view is unable to make sense of multiple-realization. Our only other option is to go with Shapiro and Polger's "hybrid" view, which doesn't make any sense at all. Their hybrid view implies that property instances are realized by properties, which is absurd: to say that M is realized by P is to say that P implements the functional role associated with M, but, because properties don't do anything, they cannot possibly implement any functional role at all. Therefore, having no way to make sense of "M is realized by P," functionalism is nonsense. Essay Question: After explaining all of the course material that is relevant to the above argument, what are two reasons for thinking that the above argument is unconvincing? (Hint -- your answer should explain: Armstrong vs. Lewis's accounts of functionalism; the two theses that compose the “standard view of realization;” Wilson’s argument against the standard view; flat vs. dimensioned realization; Shapiro and Polger’s argument against the dimensioned view; as well as their preferred version of the hybrid view. It would also be a good idea to explain either how Gillett might reply to Shapiro and Polger's argument OR how a proponent of the standard view might reply to Wilson. After you do that, you should be able to raise two objections to the argument. Be sure to phrase them clearly; I advise that you say, "The first reason to think that the above argument is unconvincing is that it assumes X, but X is false because..." where X is some claim made in the argument, a background assumption, or the assumption that the conclusion follows from the premises.)
Cоnsider the fоllоwing аrgument: All empiricаl functionаlists agree that minds are like computers, operating on syntax rather than semantics. This idea suffers from two serious problems: Searle's Chinese Room Problem, and the Problem of Mental Causation. Evidently, the only way to avoid the first problem is to reject content-externalism. But, rejecting it makes the second problem even more serious: without content-externalism, we cannot utilize Block's causal drainage argument to respond to the Problem of Mental Causation, thereby leaving the functionalist with no way to avoid the Eleatic threat of eliminativism. Since empirical functionalism is incompatible with eliminativism, empirical functionalism must therefore be false: minds are not like computers. Essay Question: After explaining all of the course material that is relevant to the above argument, what are two reasons for thinking that the above argument is unsound? (Hint -- your answer should explain: Putnam vs. Fodor's accounts of functionalism; syntax vs. semantics; the Chinese Room objection (including the Turing Test); content-externalism; the specific Problem of Mental Causation that applies to machine-state functionalism (double hint: it is not Kim's exclusion argument); Block's causal drainage argument; and you should explain how the Eleatic Principle (you should use definition #3) can be used to argue for eliminativism (be sure to define this term too). After you do that, you should be able to raise two objections to the argument. Be sure to phrase them clearly; I advise that you say, "The first reason to think that the above argument is unconvincing is that it assumes X, but X is false because..." where X is some claim made in the argument, a background assumption, or the assumption that the conclusion follows from the premises.)