As a minor cell population in the liver, stellate cells neve…
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As а minоr cell pоpulаtiоn in the liver, stellаte cells nevertheless serve as the primary storage site for vitamin A.
Pleаse reаd the fоllоwing Vоsburg v. Putney Supreme Court of Wisconsin 50 N.W. 403 (1891) The аction was brought to recover damages for [a battery], alleged to have been committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff on February 20, 1889. The answer is a general denial. At the date of the alleged [battery] the plaintiff was a little more than 14 years of age, and the defendant a little less than 12 years of age. The injury complained of was caused by a kick inflicted by defendant upon the leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee. The transaction occurred in a school–room in Waukesha, during school hours, both parties being pupils in the school. [At] trial the jury found a special verdict, as follows: “(1) Had the plaintiff during the month of January, 1889, received an injury just above the knee, which became inflamed, and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2) Had such injury on the 20th day of February, 1889, nearly healed at the point of the injury? Answer. Yes. (3) Was the plaintiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as the result of such injury? Answer. No. (4) Had the tibia in the plaintiff’s right leg become inflamed or diseased to some extent before he received the blow or kick from the defendant? Answer. No. (5) What was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s leg? Answer. Kick. (6) Did the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend to do him any harm? Answer. No. (7) At what sum do you assess the damages of the plaintiff? Answer. Twenty–five hundred dollars.” The defendant moved for judgment in his favor on the verdict, and also for a new trial. The plaintiff moved for judgment on the verdict in his favor. The motions of defendant were overruled, and that of the plaintiff granted. Thereupon judgment for plaintiff, for $2,500 damages and costs of suit, was duly entered. The defendant appeals from the judgment. LYON, J., Several errors are assigned, only [two] of which will be considered. The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and that defendant’s motion for judgment on the special verdict should have been granted. In support of this proposition counsel quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule that “the intention to do harm is of the essence of a [battery].” Such is the rule, no doubt, in [criminal] prosecutions for [battery]. But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged battery. In such case the rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also unlawful. Had the parties been upon the play–grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports, the defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff in what he did, we should hesitate to hold the act of the defendant unlawful, or that he could be held liable in this action. Some consideration is due to the implied license of the play–grounds. But it appears that the injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher, and after the regular exercises of the school had commenced. Under these circumstances, no implied license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum of the school, and necessarily unlawful. Hence we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and verdict, the action may be sustained. Certain questions were proposed on behalf of defendant to be submitted to the jury, founded upon the theory that only such damages could be recovered as the defendant might reasonably be supposed to have contemplated as likely to result from his kicking the plaintiff. The court refused to submit such questions to the jury. The ruling was correct. The rule of damages in actions for torts was held in Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. Rep. 356, 911, to be that the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. The chief justice and the writer of this opinion dissented from the judgment in that case, chiefly because we were of the opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action ex contractu, and not ex delicto, and hence that a different rule of damages––the rule here contended for –– was applicable. We did not question that the rule in actions for tort was correctly stated. That case rules this on the question of damages.