Scientists have used different methods to construct solar sy…
Questions
Scientists hаve used different methоds tо cоnstruct solаr system models. Which of these quаlities did the scientists most likely use while constructing the models? (2 points)
Dаy 2 InstructiоnsWelcоme tо Dаy 2 of the Midterm Exаm. Below you will find the full text of what you wrote on Day 1. You may copy and paste from it freely as you continue working.Your Day 2 submission is what will be graded.Use this session to:Continue writing where you left off.Revise, restructure, or strengthen your argument.Add engagement with sources you did not address on Day 1.Develop your response to objections more fully.Reminder: Your essay should be 800–1,500 words. All original exam instructions and constraints still apply.A note on your Day 1 essay: Your essay raises the right question: does simultaneity matter? However, it doesn't yet use the tools Parfit gives you to answer it. Parfit's branching cases are directly about what happens when Relation R holds between one person and two future continuers at the same time. That's not an analogy to your scenario, it IS your scenario. What does Parfit say identity does and doesn't do in branching cases, and what follows from that for the corporation's claim that each clone stands in the same relation to Sam Bell Prime as a future self? Your Day 2 essay should engage with specific arguments from at least two primary sources. You don't need quotes but try to go beyond general references to reductionism or Buddhism. More importantly, make sure you commit to a thesis rather than presenting both sides conditionally. Day 2 Wrinkle: As you continue your essay, consider the following claim from Parfit: the reductionist view does not entail that we should be less concerned about our future welfare rather it entails that we should be more concerned about the welfare of others. How does this claim bear on the argument you are making? Your Day 1 Writing: In both cases where we determine that the corporations' actions are morally agreeable or wrong, this new case does not change either argument. In the scenario where we agree that the corporation is in its moral right to create and use the clones as stipulated in the original contract, one more, or even multiple clones does not change the outcome. If we originally disagreed with the corporation, I do think that this would obviously be a far greater moral mistake, since now the scenario is using multiple clones.To make a scenario from the text that is similar, we can see the Mars teleportation experiment in which there is an error in the process that makes a copy of the original on Mars, while the original is unchanged on Earth, with both unaware of the other's existence. If we tweak this scenario slightly and make it to where there multiple teleporters receive the copies, and all create a new copy, with now an infinite possible number of clones. I would argue, that it does not change the case if it is two clones living at the same time, or hundreds or even thousands of clones at once. If we say that in the original Mars teleporter case, that because the copies do not interact, and will never interfere with the other, that it is not a problem, as there is not much difference in the different copies than there is in the passage of time. If over time, you are technically different, what difference does it make that now there are two new people. This can easily be transferred to more than one copies. If we have multiple copies across the cosmos, and neither of them will interact or disrupt the other, then this is no different than theoretical different timelines. If I decide to move to New Jersey, then, if there is a multiverse, then there is a different timeline in which I do not move out, or I decide to move to another city. While there is most definitely debate on the existence of the multiverse, it would be hard to argue that a multiverse is immoral. Comparing the Mars scenario to the multiple clones at once scenario, we can show that, while there may be multiple Sams, ignoring the practical issues of keeping them apart, then it is just as if there are multiple timelines existing at once.If we disagreed with the corporation, perhaps stating the inherent deceit of the operation, then we can argue similarly. If a Sam Bell is being mistreated in one universe, and they are just in a different location, then it is still wrong to do so in each different iteration. If the corporation was initially wrong when there is one clone, then in this case, the magnified scale would likely require greater pushback. While the original may have just had the corporation change their policy on clones, this scenario might grant greater punishment, perhaps even the cancelation of the whole company operations. To prove such drastic measures just, we must first prove how to argue the immorality of using one clone at a time. In the case that we say the company is wrong, we must show how the consent may not carry over from clone to clone, while maintaining the reductionist viewpoint. In order to set this up, we can look at how the Buddhists handle the self. When we are handling the doctrine of no self or the reductionist viewpoint, since we are saying that there is no real self, there must be a responsibility to the future you. While some may feel inclined to commit to a shortsighted view of the future given these views, we must create a reason not to throw oneself into short-term pleasures with long-term problems. The solution is to what we owe to other people. Most moral people would agree that we should not use others for our own gain if it hurts the other person, so it follows that we should not hurt our future selves in order to retain a quick dopamine hit. This can apply to the clones in the Sam Bell scenario. If we consider sending someone to work because you wanted to get paid unethical, it can be argued this is exactly what Sam Bell and the Lunar corporation is doing. Since we should not send people to work for us without their consent, we, therefore, should not let the corporation create clones to do the same thing. If we consider this to be wrong, it is easy to say that, now that there are more clones working, it is arguably the company doing more wrong.There is pushback that applies to whether or not multiple clones working at the same time makes it more wrong, or equally as wrong. Since there is no foreseeable future where the clones stop working, is not it just the same as an infinite amount of clones? And if there are infinite clones, and there are two working at the same time, it does not make it infinity plus one, or even if there is always two working, it does not make it infinity times two.If we assume that the process goes on an infinite amount of time, it is easy to demonstrate how there is no real difference in two clones at once, and I cannot find any solid arguments given the time period assumed. The only argument that I can plausibly find is that, at some amount of time, it will end, and there will have been at least one more person exploited and lied to. While I do think that it is more practical for it to have an end, if there is no end, there is no difference, so I must agree that, given an infinite amount of time, there is no difference whether or not there are overlapping clones. If, for example, every time I smoked a cigarette, a person got terminal kidney cancer, it would not matter if I smoked hundreds of times or thousands of times, it would still be an atrocity. But if I smoked one or two cigarettes, it would still be bad, but it would not make me a serial killer. It just comes down to where a line is drawn as to how bad you consider it. Maybe you do consider one to be the same moral equivalence to two or one thousand.In conclusion, while overlapping clones may sound like a tall ask, it does not make much of a difference in the reductionist or Buddhist points of views if you agreed that it was initially permissible. If you thought the original case was wrong, then it could make the case of even greater immorality, but that all depends on how far you are willing to go.